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CASES NOTED
tion of the food consumer. 10 A possible explanation for the strict rule laid down
here is that it checks a trend toward absolute liability so often imposed on a
negligent vendor of food." In contrast, the majority of courts treat the con12
sumer as having the greater interest.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-OFFICER OF CORPORATION
CONSIDERED EMPLOYEE TO EXTEND COVERAGE OF ACT
Plaintiff filed a claim for workmen's compensation for injuries sustained
while an employee in the service of the defendant corporation. In order to
bring this corporation within the jurisdiction of the compensation commission
five employees were required.' The commission found the president of the
defendant corporation in fact served in a dual capacity as executive and employee, thereby fulfilling the statutory requirement and awarded compensation. The circuit court affirmed the award. On appeal, held, that a president
of a corporation whose duties are dual in nature may be counted as an
employee for the purpose of bringing the corporation within the provisions of
the Workmen's Compensation Act.2 Brook's, Inc. v. Clayuell, 224 S.W.2d
37 (Ark. 1949).
The factors that govern whether an officer will be termed an employee
in order to bring the corporation within the provisions of a compensation
act are much the same as will entitle him to payments when he is injured.8
Generally, one will not be precluded from compensation for injuries sustained
in the scope of employment merely because of his position as a corporate
officer. 4 An award or denial will be determined by the circumstances of his
employment and his status in the corporate structure.5 When the officer performs only the ceremonial tasks required for corporate organization he is
not classified as an employee.' If his acts are of a manual or mechanical character, the officer might meet the definition of an employee. 7 However, when
the corporation is large and the salary paid to the president is in consideration
for the discharge of his duties as an officer this will ordinarily lead to the
10. See note 3 supro.
11. Id. at 621.
12. See note 8 supra.
1. 81 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 1302 (c) (1939).
2. 81 ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 1301-1349 (1939).
3. Workmen's Compensation Bureau v. People's Opinion Printing Co., 70 N.D.
442. 295 N.W. 656 (1941); State ex reL Murphy v. Welch & Brown, 187 Okla. 470, 103

P.7d 533 (1940).
4. Dewey v. Dewey Fuel Co., 210 Mich. 370, 178 N.W. 36 (1920); Skouitchi v.
Chic Cloak & Suit Co., 230 N.Y. 296, 130 N.E. 299 (1921). But cf. Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Beasley, 140 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. 1940).
5. Grossman v. Industrial Comm'n, 376 IIl. 198, 33 N.E.2d 444 (1941); Delaney
v. Dan Delaney, Inc., 36 N.W.2d 12 (Minn. 1949).
6. See note 3 supra.
7. Southern Surety Co. v. Childers, 87 Okla. 182. 209 Pac. 927 (1922).

MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
conclusion that he is not an employee.8 The ownership of stock in a private
corporation does not preclude the possibility of being considered a workerY
But if the amount of stock is substantial,' 0 or the officer is in such a position
of control that he fixes his salary, hours of duty, and is not subservient to
anyone 11 then the courts view these circumstances in a practical light and
classify the officer as an employer in effect, disregarding the separate corporate
entity.12
In the instant case the president was also general manager of the concern and spent very little time in discharging his tasks as an officer. He was
normally engaged in jobs usually assigned to employees. His salary was in
consideration for his work as president and as manager. However, he was
the majority stockholder and owed no responsibility to anyone. This latter
factor could reasonably be interpreted to conclude that the president in the
principle case was acting in the capacity of an employer rather than as an
employee.
However, the legislative intention in passing compensation acts was to
grant the employee a means of subsistence during his period of unemployment.13 Since these statutes are designed to effectuate a social reform they
are construed liberally to include the largest possible class of employees."
The spirit of these acts encourages the application of the legal fiction of the
separate corporate entity as the employer.", The courts should not be so liberal
with the use of this concept that persons not intended to be within the purview
of the Act are included to meet the requisite number in order to confer
jurisdiction upon the compensation commissioner.
8. See In re Raynes, 118 N.E. 387, 391 (Ind. 1917).

9. Claude H. Wolfe, Inc. v. Wolfe, 154 Fla. 633, 18 So.2d 535 (1944).
10. Donaldson v. Win. H. Donaldson Co., 176 Minn. 442, 223 N.W. 772 (1929);
Soars v. Soars-Lovelace, Inc., 346 Mo. 710, 142 S.W.2d 866 (1940).
11. Leigh Aitchison, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 188 Wis. 218, 205 N.W. 806 (1925)
12. Browne v. S. W. Browne Co., 221 N.Y. 28, 116 N.E. 364 (1917).
13. Bendix v. Bendix Co., 217 Minn. 439, 14 N.W.2d 464 (1944).
14. Irvan v. Bounds, 205 Ark. 752, 170 S.W,2d 674 (1943) ; Continental Casualty Co.
v. Hayne, 51 Ga. App. 650, 181 S.E. 126 (1935) ; Klasing v. Fred Schmit Contracting
Co., 335 Mo. App, 721, 73 S.W.2d 1011 (1934).
IS. Kuehnl v. Industrial Comm'n, 136 Ohio St. 313, 25 N.E.2d 682 (1940).

